This article examines the impact of the prevailing state ownership in the Chinese stock market on corporate governance and the financial regulatory system, respectively, as the internal and external monitoring mechanisms to deter corporate fraud and protect investors. In line with the literature that state ownership exaggerates the agency problem, we find that the retained state ownership in privatised firms increases the incidence of regulatory enforcements against fraud. For the stateowned enterprises (SOEs), however, larger state ownership is associated with a lower incidence of enforcement actions. This is attributed to the mutual political affiliation of the fraudulent SOEs and the regulatory commission. A new regulation ''Solutions for Listed Firm Checks'' promulgated in March 2001 has mitigated this effect by empowering the regulatory commission to increase the severity of regulatory conditions. Our evidence confirms the improvement in the regulatory environment and investor protection in the Chinese stock market brought about by the regulatory reform and development.
Introduction
Although China has experienced dramatic development in its capital markets, the influence of the state remains dominant in many respects. The state controls nearly 80% of the listed firms in the Chinese stock market (Chen et al., 2009 ) and retains ownership in nearly half of the privatised listed firms (Chen et al., 2008) . Meanwhile, the state remains influential in the legal and financial regulatory system, undermining judicial and regulatory indepen-dence (Allen et al., 2005; Chen, 2003; Chen et al., 2005) . Such institutional features have been found to affect the effectiveness of monitoring listed firms and investor protection, but its impact on regulatory inspection and enforcement against fraud is as yet under-researched. This article intends to shed light on this issue.
The determinants of fraud have been widely discussed in the literature of finance, economics, law and business ethics. International evidence (Beasley, 1996; Beasley et al., 2000; Chen et al., 2006; Dechow et al., 1996; Uzun et al. 2004) suggests that board independence measured by the proportion of independent or outside directors, and the presence of an audit committee help to enhance the internal monitoring mechanisms and consequently reduce the incidence of fraud. In addition to the board of directors, a supervisory board also plays a monitoring role for Chinese listed firms. Ding et al. (2007 Ding et al. ( , 2011 and Jia et al. (2009) , however, show that this is not effective in deterring fraudulent activities, but passively reacts to enforcement actions. Firth (2005) show that the China's Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) (regulatory commission hereafter) is concerned about fraud because auditors are sanctioned for failing to detect and report certain material misstatement frauds. Chen et al. (2005) show that the regulatory commission is not a toothless tiger as its enforcement actions decrease the stock price of the fraudulent firms.
These studies have weaknesses in that they fail to consider the impact of state ownership of the listed firms on the effectiveness of external monitoring mechanisms, although Allen et al. (2005) the Chinese legal and financial regulatory systems, and the laws and regulations are not effectively enforced when the politically powerful defendants are involved. We therefore expect that fraud inspection differs across firms with various strengths of political connections. In addition, the impact of exogenous regulatory changes has not been considered in the literature; in particular, the consequence of the new regulation ''Solutions for Listed Firm Checks'', promulgated in 2001, has not been investigated. Finally, the data used in some of the studies were collected from newspapers and could miss some enforcement actions. This article aims to remedy these shortcomings by arguing that state ownership plays an important role in the effectiveness of both corporate governance and legal/regulatory systems, as internal and external monitoring mechanisms, respectively, and that regulatory changes also influence the regulatory environment.
To carry out our analysis, we include all regulatory enforcements of fraud from 1999 to 2008 in the Chinese stock market and, respectively, construct a firm-year sample and a matching-firm sample as robustness checks of each other. We classify the listed firms into state-owned enterprise (SOEs) and non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs). Our main findings are as follows. For non-SOEs, the ratio of state ownership is positively related to the incidence of regulatory enforcements against fraud. This confirms our prediction that state ownership weakens the internal monitoring mechanism of the listed firms leaving opportunities for management to commit fraud. This is in line with the literature (see Cheung et al., 2010; Clarke, 2003; Gul et al., 2010; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986 ) that state ownership aggravates agency problems. Meanwhile, the fraudulent activities in non-SOEs are likely to be uncovered by the regulatory commission in that they lack political resources which could otherwise provide favourable regulatory conditions (Allen et al., 2005; Anderson, 2000) .
For SOEs, however, we find that the ratio of state ownership is negatively related to the incidence of regulatory enforcements against fraud. Although the literature suggests that SOEs with concentrated state ownerships are associated with even weaker corporate governance, they tend to affiliate with the central government which has the supreme power.
The politically powerful affiliations of these fraudulent SOEs could bring certain privileges in the regulatory environment and help them to avoid the non-transparent selective inspections from the regulatory commission. Such privileges of political connection, however, have been substantially weakened by the new regulation ''Solutions for Listed Firm Checks'' promulgated in March 2001 to replace the old regulation ''Solutions to Carry Out Listed Firm Checks System''. This new regulation mandates regular and detailed fraud inspections on all listed firms to substitute for the practice of selective inspections, empowering the regulatory commission and increasing inspection severity (Chen et al., 2005) . We document an increase in the incidence of regulatory enforcements on SOEs with larger state ownerships and richer in political resources following the promulgation of the new regulations; whilst the sanction incidence on non-SOEs is not significantly affected. This suggests that the fraud inspection and enforcement actions are subject to less political intervention under the new regulation. These findings exist in both the firm-year sample and the matching-firm sample, and are robust to the controls of firm characteristics (i.e. size, growth), operating performance, corporate governance (i.e. ownership concentration, CEO duality, board size and board independence) as well as industry and region fixed effects.
Our findings contribute to the literature in several ways. This is the first study, to our knowledge, to compare the effects of state ownership on the incidence of regulatory enforcements against fraud between SOEs and non-SOEs. For the corporate governance literature, we empirically confirm the argument that state ownership damages the effectiveness of internal monitoring mechanisms. For the literature on legal and regulatory systems, we provide new evidence that state affiliation of both the listed firms and the regulatory commission harms regulatory independence and regulation enforcement. In addition, this is also the first study, to our knowledge, to examine the exogenous regulatory changes on the severity of fraud inspection. For the literature on economic reform, we show that the new regulation of ''Solutions for Listed Firm Checks'' yields a beneficial impact to this emerging stock market of China.
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